Russia pays a markup of nearly 90% on sanctioned products from China, compared to 9% for other countries.
In early 2022, Russia and China declared their friendship had “no limits,” just before Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
More than three years later, those relations appear increasingly unbalanced and apparently do not include friendly discounts, while Moscow relies heavily on Beijing to cushion the blow of Western sanctions.
A recent report from the Bank of Finland’s Institute for Emerging Economies found that the median price paid by Russia for Chinese exports of sanctioned products soared by 87% between 2021 and 2024. For exports from other countries, in contrast, prices of sanctioned products increased by only 9% during this period.
The researchers highlighted ball bearings, which are on the European Union’s list of high priority items. While the value of China’s ball bearing exports to Russia jumped 76% between 2021 and 2024, the export quantity actually fell by 13%, indicating that the unit price doubled.
And for tapered roller bearings, the unit price has almost quadrupled. Both types of products constitute essential industrial inputs that could also be used in the Russian arms sector.
“Our general results, illustrated here by two simple examples, lead us to conclude that trade sanctions have succeeded in limiting Russia’s access to essential goods,” the Bank of Finland said.
To be sure, China was not the only country that could obtain higher prices from Russia. The report said that prices of Turkish exports of sanctioned products to Russia increased by 25-55% compared to other exports.
Overall, prices of sanctioned products were 40% higher than prices of non-sanctioned products.
A separate note from Capital Economics says total bilateral trade between Russia and China fell 9% in the first nine months of 2025 compared to a year ago. This is after trade more than doubled between 2020 and 2024.
China now accounts for 30% of Russia’s merchandise exports and 50% of its imports. On the other hand, Russia accounts for only 3% of China’s merchandise exports and 5% of its imports.
While Chinese companies fear the potential consequences of Western sanctions against Moscow, there is no indication that China is expanding its supply chains in Russia, while foreign direct investment remains limited.
“Overall, relations between Russia and China are – and will remain – asymmetric,” Capital Economics said. “China is more economically important to Russia than Russia is to China. And Russia wants and needs more relationships than China is willing to provide.”
The reports come as the Kremlin proposed trade deals with the United States as part of negotiations to end the war in Ukraine and lift sanctions.
Meanwhile, Putin’s war economy is hitting a wall as production bottlenecks, labor shortages, tightened public spending and a lack of Western technology increasingly cause tensions.
“To produce significantly more equipment or recruit and train significantly more soldiers, Moscow would need to adopt a more comprehensive war posture by directing all available resources toward military needs, as it did during World War II, or by commandeering civilian production lines for military purposes,” wrote Alexandra Prokopenko, a researcher at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center and former adviser to the Russian central bank. Foreign Affairs last month.
